Login: Login as another user¶
When logging in, the client exchanges it's identifier and password for a authentication token and logs in using this token from that point on. $res->loginAs allows you to login a current client as another user by their z_user.`id`.
The authentication token will track the exec user though. using this data, you'll always know who was logged in as who. You can also set an exec_user yourself, using the second argument of loginAs (default: the logged in user itself). You are also able to login as another user using the very same panel.
Example:
$res->loginAs(1, 2); //Logs the requesting session in as user 1 and marks the real user as 2.
loginAs is a plain session issuer and has no guards: it performs no permission check (the caller decides who may use it), does not invalidate the user's other sessions (concurrent sessions are allowed) and does not change user() of the current request. The new login applies from the next request on, when the client sends the cookie. $userId is typed int, so a non-numeric string (for example from a URL) throws a TypeError. It logs USER_LOGGED_IN, or USER_LOGGED_IN_ANOTHER when $user_exec differs from $userId.
$res->logout() invalidates only the current session and logs USER_LOGGED_OUT. During a login as another user it then calls loginAs() for the exec user, which issues a fresh token, otherwise it deletes the cookie, and it always ends with a redirect to the root, also for a client that is not logged in.
Naming a session and recording why it exists¶
Every session records the request that created it on its own: device holds the user agent and ip_creation the address. The two optional arguments are what you choose yourself - a $name for the label a "your active sessions" list shows, and a $reason for why the session exists, which is what makes an impersonation traceable afterwards:
$res->loginAs(1, 2, "Support session", "Ticket #4711"); //Names the session and records why it was opened
Both values are read back through Session::byUser().
The session cookie¶
loginAs sends the token to the client as the z_login_token cookie, set through setFrameworkCookie (a wrapper around setCookie) with these attributes:
| Attribute | Value |
|---|---|
Expires |
time() + loginTimeoutSeconds (7 days when the setting is unset) |
Path |
/ |
Domain |
.<domain> when login_scope_allow_subdomains is switched on, otherwise none (host-only). A second z_login_token delete header (on login and logout) is then sent for the domain in login_scope_allow_subdomains_delete_domainscope_name (to clean up cookies from before the switch) whenever that key exists, even empty, and an empty value deletes the host-only cookie just set |
Secure |
set when the host setting starts with https:// |
HttpOnly |
never set, because Z.js and the session watcher read the cookie in JavaScript |
SameSite |
Lax |
In the admin panel¶
The panel passes the current exec user on, so nested impersonation keeps the real identity, which checkSuperPermission() checks.
The "Login as" button on the user edit page asks for a reason before it sends you
on. Leaving it empty or cancelling still logs you in - the session then records
z-admin impersonation instead. Whatever is typed is cut to the 255 characters
the column takes, so a long explanation shortens rather than failing.